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ANNOUNCEMENT
The REVIEW takes pleasure in announcing the election to the
Editorial Board of the following members of the Third Year Class:
Stanley B. Cooper, Walter Edward Greenwood, Daniel Miller, Ray-
mond deS. Shryock and Theodore Voorhees.
NOTES
WHAT CONSTITUTES A TRANSFER UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTATE
TAX ?-In the recent case of Tyler v. United States,' it was necessary
for the court to decide whether the Revenue Act of x16 2 required
the value of a tenancy by the entireties in personal property, created
in Maryland after the passage of the Act,3 to be included in deter-
mining the value of the taxable estate of the decedent at the time
of his death, and if so whether the statutory provision was constitu-
tional. The court held that the statute purported to include such
tenancies as part of the decedent's estate for the purpose of the estate
tax, that by the law of Maryland there was no transfer from the de-
cedent to the surviving spouse, and that therefore this provision of
the Act was unconstitutional.
The federal estate tax is not a tax upon the property of the de-
cedent, for as such it would be unconstitutional as an unapportioned
direct tax. For the same reason it is inaccurate to describe the tax
as imposed upon an interest which has ceased by reason of death.4
Nor is it a tax on the privilege of the devisee or legatee to succeed
to the decedent's property,5 as are the legacy or succession taxes im-
posed by most states.8 It is sustained as a tax imposed upon an event,
namely, the transfer or transmission of the decedent's interest in
property by will or descent from the decedent.7
1 U. S. D. C., Md., October 3o, 1928.
239 STAT. 777 (gi6), U. S. CoitP. STAT. (i918) § 6336/a.
'Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 391 (I922) holds that the act
does not apply to transactions consummated before its passage.
'Blount v. U. S., 59 Court Claims 328, 346 (924): "It would hardly be
contended that this statute imposes a tax on an estate for life held by one at the
time of his death on the theory that the tax is upon an interest which ceases by
reason of the death."
'Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (i9oo); Lederer v.
Northern Trust Co., 262 Fed. 52, 54 (C. C. A. 3d, 192o), where it was said that
the tax "is imposed not upon the interest of the recent owner, or upon the privi-
lege to dispose of it, but upon the transfer of the interest in its devolution."
PINK RTON AND MILLsAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES (1926) 26.
'Knowlton v. Moore supra note 5; U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct.
256 (192r) ; Lederer v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 5; New York Trust Co.
v. Eisner, 263 Fed. 620 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. I92O).
(383)
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How can the federal government impose such a tax? The power
is not based upon the right to regulate the succession of property
after death by will or descent; that is a right reserved to the states,
there being no grant of such power to the federal government in
the Constitution. But the United States has the power to levy taxes,
duties, imposts and excises.8 This power is coextensive with the
general taxing power of a sovereignty which extends to all usual
subjects of taxation.9 The tax as shown above is based on the trans-
mission and.not upon the right to regulate, and the transmission of
property occasioned by death has always been a usual object of tax-
ation among the sovereignties of the world.10
The estate tax is an indirect tax." Historically it "has ever
been treated as a duty or excise, because of the particular occasion
which gives rise to its levy." 12 Other than capitation taxes, direct
taxes have been held to be those levied on a person solely because of
his general ownership of real or personal property.' 3 And in a later
declaration of the same rule the word "general" is omitted and direct
taxes are said to be those imposed by reason of ownership.' 4 The
estate tax is not a tax on the ownership of property but on an event;
namely, the transfer from the decedent. Not being a direct tax it is
not necessary that it be apportioned among the several states,' 5 pro-
vided it is uniform, 6 and provided it is levied on the transfer as
measured by the value of the decedent's property actually transmitted.
In the Tyler case, the first decision of the court was one of stat-
utory construction. It construed the Revenue Act of 1976" as at-
'U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, Sec. 8 (I).
Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 5, at 58, 59.
"oKnowlton v. Moore, supra note 5; N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S.
345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506 (i92i). And see the history of death duties in GLEAsoN
AND OTIS, INHERITANcE TAXATION (3d ed. 1922) 4; PINKERTON AND MILLSAPS,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 9.
' Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 5, at 78; N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra
note io.
"Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 5, at 8I. On the question whether a tax
is direct or indirect Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "Upon this point a page of
history is worth a volume of logic." N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra note io,
at 349.
1 Knowlton v. Moore, suPra note 5, at 82, in discussing Pollock v. Farmer's
Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, i58 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895).
"Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. i89, 205, 40 Sup. Ct. i89, 192 (192o), in
discussing Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., supra note I3.
U. S. CONsTITUTION, Art. I, Sec. 2 (3) and Sec. 9 (4).
"U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, Sec. 8.
1739 STAT. 777 (i9i6), U. S. CoMp. STAT. (19i8) §63363/a. Sec. 202 pro-
vides: "That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property . . . (c) To the
extent of the interest therein held jointly or as tenants in the entirety by the
decedent and any other person . . . except such part thereof as may be shown
to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have belonged to
the decedent." (In the Tyler case the property had previously belonged to the
NOTES
tempting to include, as part of the decedent's estate, tenancies by the
entireties in which the decedent had an interest before death. In arriv-
ing at this interpretation the court discarded dicta to the contrary 1 8
and read the statute in the light of the later acts which in clear lan-
guage seem to include such tenancies as part of the decedent's
estate.19 An appellate court might decide that the I916 Act should
not be interpreted to include tenancies by the entireties as part of
the decedent's estate,'0 where under the law of the state there is no
transfer, and thus avbid considering the constitutional question other-
wise raised. Indeed, the Act of 1916 and all subsequent revenue
acts, 21 in imposing the estate tax, provide that the tax is "imposed upon
the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage
of this act." It would seem that under this section, which in the
various acts imposes the tax, that it would be a possible con-
struction of the statutes that the tax is only to be levied when under
the state law an interest is transferred from the decedent to others
at his death by will or descent.
22
Considering the constitutional problem involved, the court first
laid down the proposition that only such interests may constitutionally
be included in determining the value of the gross estate as are trans-
ferred from the decedent to others at his death,23 and then applied
the second proposition that in order to determine whether the death
decedent alone.) It was argued that "in the entirety" was not an estate known
to the law, that the estate created in man and wife by a conveyance to both of
them was "by the entirety or entireties." The court dismissed this argument as
a mere distinction of phraseology and held the clear intent of the statute could
not be so contravened.
"Blount v. U. S., supra note 4; Appeal of Root, 5 B. T. A. 696; Appeal of
Murphy, 5 B. T. A. 952; Appeal of Dyer, 5 B. T. A. 711; Appeal of Providence
Trust Co., 5 B. T. A. ioo4.
In the 1924 and 1926 Acts the words "in the entirety" are changed to "by
the entirety" and the words "any other person" to "spouse."
' It would seem, however, that the language of the statute, supra note 17,
is reasonably open to the interpretation given it by the court in the Tyler case.
However the appellate court might emphasize the enacting clause which de-
scribes the tax as a transfer tax.
' Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 777 (i96) ; Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT.
i097 (1919) ; Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 277 (i921) ; Revenue Act of 3924,
43 STAT. 303 (1924), 26 U. S. C. §§ io92, io93, io94; Revenue Act of 1926, 44
STAT. 69 (1926).
n Under the revenue acts, with the exception of that of 1926 which omits
this provision, the value of the gross estate (from which certain deductions are
allowed in determining the net estate) is to be determined by including the
value at the time of the decedent's death of all his property "to the extent of the
interest therein of the decedent at the time of, his death which after his death is
subject to the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its
administration and is subjct to distribution as part of his estate." In this con-
nection see the recent case of Harrelson v. Crooks, 28 F. (2d) 510 (D. C. W.
D. Mo. 1928) holding that real estate not subject to the expenses of administration
under state law cannot be included in the gross estate in determining the federal
estate tax under the revenue act of I918.
' On the authority of the cases cited supra note 7.
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of a tenant by the entirety involves a transfer to the surviving tenant,
the federal courts must look to the law of the state where the property
is located. In regard to this second proposition, the court said, "it is
necessary . . . to understand the exact nature of a tenancy (by the
entireties as such an estate is understood by the law of Maryland, for
the construction which the Maryland courts give to such tenancy
is binding upon the court in this proceeding." 24 Having determined
that by the law of Maryland there was not a transfer of any interest
from the decedent to the surviving spouse both having taken, not by
moieties, but by the entirety,25 the court reasoned that the imposition
of the tax would not be in the nature of an excise or indirect tax
levied upon the occurrence of an event, but would be a direct tax on
property because of the decedent's former ownership thereof, which
would be invalid since not apportioned as required by the Constitution.
The argument of the Government was that a complete trans-
fer of all the privileges attaching to the ownership of property
was not essential to the constitutional validity of a federal ex-
cise tax, but that if the decedent's death operated to endow a
survivor with certain substantial privileges incident to a complete
sole ownership of property, which he did not have in the lifetime
of the decedent, then there was a sufficient event on which to consti-
tutionally impose an excise tax as opposed to a direct tax. The
argument is thus expressed by counsel:
"In effect there accrued to the widow upon the decedent's
death something which she did not have in his lifetime, namely,
the unrestricted right to dispose of the whole property and give
good title thereto. That which fixed the wife's right was the
husband's death-death completed the transfer. It is true only
in a highly technical sense, that nothing passed to the wife on
the husband's death. The transfer thus completed by death is
in the nature of a testamentary disposition. The purpose of
creating an estate by the entireties is to secure the right of sur-
vivorship. That is, to direct the devolution of property at death.
Therefore when a person purchases property with his own money
and transfers it to himself and his wife as tenants by the en-
tireties, [as the decedent did in the Tyler case] he in effect ex-
ercises the right of post-mortem disposition and gives his wife
the absolute title contingent upon his death."
No direct precedent exists on the question whether an unappor-
honed federal death duty may constitutionally be imposed when a
tenant by the entirety dies, although a dictum from another district
court would tend to the same conclusion as that reached by the court
21 Citing Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 20 Sup. Ct. 873 (19oo).
' Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878) ; McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 390,
37 Atl. 214 (1897); Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 Atl. io6o (igoi);
Ades v. Caplin, 132 Md. 66, 1o3 Atl. 94 (igi8). And see (1928) 76 U. oF PA.
L. R-v. 469.
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in the Tyler case.26 However, there are decisions on analogous prob-
lems which involve the same principles. These cases almost uniformly
hold that in determining whether there has been a transfer within the
purview of the federal estate tax acts the federal courts must look to
the law of the state wherein the property is located, and if, under the
state law, there is no transfer, no death duty may constitutionally be
imposed, except as a direct tax. Thus in two cases, 27 cited by the court
in the Tyler case, it was held that including as part of the decedent's
estate, the dower right accruing to the wife upon the decedent's
death, is unconstitutional as attempting direct taxation. In both of
these cases, under the law of the states in which the property was
located, a widow's dower was not transferred to her upon the
death of her husband but was an inchoate right arising out of the
marriage contract, and this was the basis of the decisions. A
devise or bequest in lieu of dower, not being diminishable for
purposes of state taxation by the value of the widow's dower right,
it was held that, when the widow took an interest in lieu of dower,
the value of her dower was properly included in computing the value
of the estate subject to the federal estate tax.2 8 Under the law of
Louisiana the usufruct of a widow in half of the community property
not devised by her husband being part of the transfer of that prop-
erty devolving from the husband to her upon his death, it was held
not to be deductable under the federal revenue act.20  And again,
it was held that under the law of California a wife has not such a
vested interest in the community property as to prevent that prop-
erty being subject in its full value to the estate tax on the death of
the husband.30 In cases involving joint tenancies, the same principles
have been adopted in determining to what extent the value of the
property may be included in ascertaining the taxable value of the
decedent's estate.31
Only one case, in a lower federal court,3 2 has been found which is
somewhat out of line with the authorities just considered. That case
-' Walker v. Grogan, 283 Fed. 530, 534 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1922).
Munroe v. U. S., io F. (2d) 23o (D. C. D. Neb. 1925) ; Hibbard v. Crooks,
2s F. (2d) 896 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1927). These cases involved the constitutionality
of the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918, which was the first to specifically
include the wife's dower as an interest to be included in determining the value
of the decedent's gross estate. Cf. Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993 (D. C. M. D.
Tenn. 192o), decided under the Revenue Act of 1916 which did not specifically
include dower as a part of the taxable estate of decedent.
' Title Guaranty and Trust Co. v. Edwards, 290 Fed. 617 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1922).
' Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 Fed. 688 (D. C. W. D. La. 1921).
Talcott v. U. S., 23 F. (2d) 896 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) affirming 22 F.. (2d)
493 (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1927).
' Kissam v. McElligott, 28o Fed. 212 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. i92o) aff'd, Knox
v. McElligott, 258 U. S. 546, 42 Sup. Ct 396 (1922) on authority of Shwab v.
Doyle, supra note 3; Walker v. Grogan, supra note 26; see Carter v. English,
15 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 9th, i926).
Pennsylvania Co. v. Lederer, 292 Fed. 629 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 192i).
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involved the Revenue Act of 1918, which provided that the gross
value of the decedent's estate should be determined by including the
value of all property "to the extent of any property passing under a
general power of appointment exercised by the decedent." The state
law held that the property passes from the donor of the power to the
appointee and not from the donee of the power. The court, however,
sustained a federal tax on the estate of the donee of the power includ-
ing in its value the property passing under the exercise of the power,
on the theory that the 1918 Act showed a Congressional intention of
"measuring the tax paid by the gross value of all the property of the
decedent which passed by will plus the value of all property which
passed in practical effect by the same will, although it passed, not by
iirtue of domain over the property, but by virtue of a power of ap-
pointment." The court did not consider the question whether such a
tax was an unapportioned direct tax.
In spite of this somewhat inconsistent decision, the Tyler case
appears to be correctly decided, though the Supreme Court has never
passed on the point. Where the incidents of property ownership
which vest in one person by the death of another are as few as in that
case, it is difficult to describe the tax as not levied directly on the own-
ership of property, where according to the state law there is not a
complete transfer of all the incidents of the ownership of property. 33
However, since such a result places a premium on property located in
certain states 3 4 and there makes possible the avoidance of the estate
tax, it is regrettable if legally sound. It would seem that the Supreme
Court, if the question is raised before it, must affirm the principle of
the Tyler case, but one cannot speak with assurance in a field that is
full of so many artificial distinctions.
E. S. L., Jr.
LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS OF DEFECTIVE ARTICLES FOR
INJURY TO PURCHASERS FROM MIDDLEMEN-Injury caused by a
defect in a manufactured article purchased not from the manufac-
turer but from a middleman, is a very common source of litigation.
Where the requisite elements are present, of course the middleman
may be held either in tort or assumpsit.1 But for various reasons,
' Compare the question of the constitutionality of inheritance taxes on trust
estates, discussed in Note (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 176.
"In Pennsylvania, for example, tenancies by the entireties are still recog-
nized. Joint tenancies may also be created. See (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 29o.
'The Uniform Sales Act, which has been widely adopted, purports in gen-
eral to codify the common law on this subject. Section 12 deals with express
warranties, and section 15 with implied warranties of quality. The decisions
under these sections, particularly the latter, are by no means uniform. For dis-
cussions of the problems raised by these sections, see Mechem, Implied Warran-
ties in Sale of Goods by Trade Nrames (1927) II MNN. L. Rxv. 485; Brown,
Implied Warranties of Quality in Sales of Articles Under Patent or Trade
Names (3924) 2 Wis. L. REv. 385; Note (1922) 70 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219;
Note (1927) I U. OF Cix. L. RE,. 461.
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both to establish a theory of recovery and from practical con-
siderations, it is often desirable to sue the manufacturer, with whom
the person injured has had no contractual relationship. The effort
to hold the manufacturer liable has resulted in a host of conflicting
decisions, both in tort and contractual forms of action. Generally
the absence of privity of contract has proved a stumbling block in
the way of recovery, whether the manufacturer has been sued in tort
or for breach of warranty.
The early Engligh case of Winterbottom v. Wright,2 generally
understood to hold that the manufacturer owed no duty of care as
to defects of original construction to persons not in privity of con-
tract with him, has often been cited as authority for the non-liability
of the manufacturer in an action ex delictu. Although the case does
not support this proposition,8 it had a profound effect upon the
cases that followed. Gradually, however, the courts whittled away
this theory of non-liability of the manufacturer, and came, in certain
circumstances, to impose a duty upon him toward persons not in
privity of contract with him. In i9o3,4 Judge Sanborn, summing
up the law as it then existed, found that the cases established three
exceptions to the rule that one supplying goods to another was not
liable to persons with whom he was not in privity of contract for
injuries caused them by negligent defects in the goods: (i) the
negligent act of a manufacturer which is imminently dangerous to the
life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the preparation
of articles intended to preserve, destroy or affect human life; ' (2)
the presence of negligently defective appliances upon the -premises
causing injury to a business guest; 6 (3) where the manufacturer
knows of the defect and can reasonably anticipate injury to life or
limb to others than those in contractual relationship with him.7 This
was the state of the law until the decision in the case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.' In that case the article sold was an automobile,
210 M. & W. iog (Eng. i84).
'BoHiLEN, STUDIES ID THE LAw ol: TORTS (1926) 76. The same article
appears in (1905) 53 U. OF PA. L. REV. 2o9.
' Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865, 87o, 871 (C. C. A.
8th, i9o3).
Citing for this exception, Dixon v. Bell, 5 Maule & S. 198 (Eng. 1816);
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Norton v. Sewall, io6 Mass. 143
(I87o) ; Elldns, Bly & Co. v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493 (1875) z Bishop v. Weber,
139 Mass. 411, I N. E. 154 (1885); Peters v. Johnson, 5o W. Va. 644, 41 S. E.
190 (I902).
'Citing for this exception, Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124
(874) ; Bright v. Barnett & Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 6o N. W. 418 (894) ;
Heaven v. Pender, ii Q. B. D. 503 (1883); Roddy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.,
104 Mo. 234, 15 S. W. 1112 (1891).
7Citing for this exception, Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519 (Eng. 1837);
Wellington v. Oil Co., 1O4 Mass. 64 (187o) ; Lewis v. Terry, Iii Cal. 39, 43 Pac.
398 (1896).
8217 N. Y. 382, Ii N. E. io~o (i9i6).
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which certainly is not an article intended to preserve, destroy or affect
human life and hence "inherently dangerous," nor did the manufac-
turer know of the defect, nor, of course, was it a case of injury to a
business guest caused by defective appliances upon the premises. The
case, therefore, clearly does not fall within any of the three exceptions
pointed out by Judge Sanborn. The court, however, held that the
manufacturer owed a duty of care not only to the subpurchaser from
the dealer to whom the manufacturer had sold the car, but to all others
who were rightful users of it. In the words of Judge Cardoza:
"If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably cer-
tain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made,9 it is
then a thing of danger . . . If to the element of danger there
is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons, other
than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then irrespec-
tive of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make .it carefully." 10
This clearly should be the real inquiry in order to determine the
manufacturer's liability, regardless of whether or not privity of con-
tract exists, for important as that element may be in establishing lia-
bility ex contractu, it is difficult to see how it has any logical appli-
cation in the determination of tort liability. Although MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., was decided quite recently, it has already exer-
cised considerable influence."' And even in jurisdictions which have
not as yet adopted the rule of this case, there is a tendency to extend
liability beyond that imposed by the three exceptions previously
alluded to. Thus in California, where the courts have failed to
adopt the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,12 the recent case
of Kolberg v. Sherwin Williams Co.,'3 held that the "inherently dan-
gerous" doctrine applied to articles inherently dangerous to property
as well as to human life. This case is very interesting in view of
the fact that in a recent case, 4 the New York Court of Appeals,
in a dictum stated that it was uncertain whether the doctrine of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., would be extended so as to establish
liability for damage to property rights as distinguished from per-
sonal injuries. Certainly there seems to be no valid distinction be-
tween danger to life and danger to property, which should relieve the
manufacturer of a duty of care where the latter is involved.
The italics are the writer's.
"Supra note 8 at 389, III N. E. at 1053.
=Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919);
Heckel v. Ford Motor Car Co., Ioi N. J. L. 385, 128 Atl. 242 (1925); White
Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, 162 N. E. 633 (Ohio, 1927) ; Ford Motor Car Co.
v. Livesay, 61 Okla. 231, 16o Pac. 9O1 (I916).
"See (1928) 2 So. CALIF. L. REv. 92.
13269 Pac. 975 (Cal. 1928).
" Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newtown By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y.
293, 296, 162 N. E. 84, 85 (1928).
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Even if the liability of the manufacturer in tort were conceded,
it is often desirable to bring a contractual form of action, because
of the difficulty of proving negligence, especially where the "res ipsa
loqitur" doctrine cannot be applied.15 However, in actions ex con-
tractu as for breach of warranty, courts are again confronted with
that troublesome problem, lack of privity between the parties, and
in this situation with a great deal more reason than in tort actions.
The great majority of cases have held there cannot be an action for
breach of warranty, unless there is a contractual relationship between
the parties.' 6 But in actions for breach of warranty, lack of privity
between the parties should not necessarily be fatal. As Williston
points out,"17 the original bases of actions on warranties sounded in
tort, being based on the warrantor's deceit. Moreover, in many cases
warranties are imposed by law, regardless of whether they are in
accordance with the parties' intentions. This is sufficient indication
that warranties are not so essentially part of a contract that they
cannot be dissociated from it, so as to accrue to the advantage of
one who has suffered from a breach of the warranty, even though he
was not a party to the contract.
A number of cases have made an exception in the case of food,'"
holding the manufacturer liable, even in the absence of privity.
However, there is no logical reason for distinguishing food from
other articles in actions for breach of warranty. Courts that make
this distinction really are confusing tort liability with contract
liability when they hold that manufacturers of food are under
a stricter duty of care, and hence liable to the ultimate consumer for
breach of warranty. If an action for breach of warranty should
be available to the subpurchaser in one case, it should be available in
all cases. Hence, two recent cases, granting a right of action
for breach of an implied warranty to the subpurchaser, on rea-
soning broad enough to cover any type of article sold, are very
significant. Both cases reached the same result, but the decisions
in the two cases are based on different and unrelated theories.
In Coca Cola Bottling Works *v. Lyons,9 the plaintiff was treated
by a friend to a bottle of soft drink manufactured by the defendant,
and purchased by the friend from a middleman. Here the relation-
Many courts apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in cases where foreign
articles are found in food. See annotation in (1919) 4 A. L. R. 559.
"Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S. W. 288 (19o5); Rob-
erts v. Anheuser-Busch Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95 (I912) ; Chysky v.
Drake, 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 577 (1923); Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Works, 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915).
171 Wn.lisToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 244.
'Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., i89 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920);
Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914) ; Flessher v. Carstens
Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 16o Pac. 14 (I916). Contra: Nelson v. Armour
Packing Co., Chysky v. Drake, both supra note 14; Cohen v. Dugan Bros., 132
Misc. Rep. 896 (N. Y. 1928).
" III So. 305 (Miss. 1927).
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ship between the plaintiff and the defendant was more remote than
in the ordinary case, for the plaintiff was not even a purchaser. How-
ever, the court held that the defendant was liable for breach of the
implied warranty that the contents of the bottle were fit as a bever-
age, stating that there was no necessity for privity between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, for all warranties passed together with title
to the article sold, in the same manner that a covenant running with
land, passes with title to the land. In Ward Baking Co. v. TriL-
zino,
20 the plaintiff bought from a retailer, a cake manufactured by
the defendant, and was injured by a needle lodged in the cake. The
court permitted the plaintiff to recover for breach of an implied war-
ranty on the theory that the contract between the manufacturer and
the middleman was for the benefit of the ultimate consumer, and
hence that he could take advantage of all warranties which were part
of the contract.
Unfortunately, the law extending a right of action to third per-
sons, for whose benefit a contract was made, does not sustain the
position of the court in Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino. The main
object of the contract between the manufacturer and the middleman
obviously was not to benefit in any way the ultimate consumer, who
if he is a beneficiary at all, which seems very doubtful,2 is only an
incidental beneficiary. And it is well settled that third persons who
are only incidentally benefited by a contract have no right of action
on that contract.2 2 However, the law of third party beneficiaries
may be cited as an analogous situation, in which the doctrine of priv-
ity of contract stood in the way of recovery and was discarded by
the courts in aid of what they considered substantial justice. As
Corbin has shown in a recent article,23 the entire development of the
law of third party beneficiaries has been a conflict between two oppos-
ing doctrines, one requiring privity of contract, the other establishing
the rights of third parties for whose benefit a contract is made, and
in most American jurisdictions, the courts have definitely brushed
aside, in this situation, any necessity for privity of contract. 24 Why
should not the rule requiring privity of contract be relaxed also in
the situation where a subpurchaser sues the manufacturer for breach
of warranty? If all that stands in the way of permitting a right of
action to the subpurchaser is want of a sufficient legal theory,
it is submitted that the case of Coca-Cola Co. v. Lyons offers a suit-
able one. It is true that the analogy of covenants running with land
is not a very close one, for there the purchaser of land succeeds to an
161 N. E. 557 (Ohio, 1928).
See i WmrI~STON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1924) § 347 et seq.
'See I WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1924) §§ 402, 403, and cases cited
thereunder.
' Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania (1928)
77 U. OF PA. L. Rmv. i.
24 Ibid.
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obligation, while in this case the purchaser of the chattel becomes in-
vested with an additional right. But in both situations it is equally
true that the successor to title, finds himself in a quasi-contractual
relationship with some person other than his immediate grantor of
title. The theory adopted by the court in the Coca-Cola Co. case
would seem to be sufficiently sound to bear successfully any legal
analysis, and has the advantage of simplicity of application.
There is no reason, either logical or practical, to adhere to the
doctrine of privity of contract, to defeat recovery by the subpurchaser
in a situation where it seems clear that, to meet the ends of justice,
the manufacturer should be liable. Without venturing to decide what
is the soundest theory on which to explain such a recovery, plainest
justice demands that such a recovery be sustained.
J. M.
APPLICATION OF THE "IMMINENT PERIL" DOCTRINE WHERE
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY IS THREATENED--In the recent case of John-
son v. Terminal Railroad Association,: an employee of the defendant
railroad negligently failed to "chock" a moving freight car, and the
plaintiff, another employee, seeing that a collision between the mov-
ing car and other stationary cars was imminent, voluntarily left his
place of safety and attempted to avert the disaster. It did not ap-
pear that the plaintiff was guilty of rash or reckless conduct, either
in making the effort to save the property, or in the manner of making
it. Having been injured in the attempt, he brought suit against the
defendant under the federal Employer's Liability .Act.2 The Supreme
court of Missouri held that the plaintiff could not recover. The
court reasoned that it could not be foreseen that the plaintiff would
voluntarily leave a place of safety in the defense of mere property,
and that therefore the plaintiff's intervention, not the negligence of
the defendant, was the proximate cause of the resultant injury. Blair,
J., said, "This state does not recognize the application of the 'im-
minent peril' doctrine where mere property damage is involved."
In analyzing this type of situation, at least four inquiries are
involved, which must be distinguished witl as much precision as pos-
sible. These four problems are (I) whether the defendant s violated
any duty to the plaintiff to use due care (2) whether the defendant's
act was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury (3) whether the
'8 S. W. (2d) 891 (Mo. 1928).
235 STAT. 65 §§ i-8 (i9o8) and 36 STAT. 291 §§ 1-2, U. S. C. (925) TIT.
XLV §§ 51-59. These acts in effect abolish the common law "fellow servant"
doctrine as far as persons engaged in interstate commerce are concerned, thus
enabling a servant to sue his principal for injury caused by his fellow servant's
negligence. The acts give the state courts concurrent jurisdiction with the fed-
eral courts in this matter.
' Under the Employers' Liability Act, the question involved in the Missouri
case is the same as if the plaintiff had been injured by any negligent tortfeasor.
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plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and (4) whether the
plaintiff's recovery is barred by voluntary assumption of risk. In
particular, the problem here is to determine how to describe such a
decision as was handed down by the Missouri court in the principal
case.4 It would seem conducive to clear analysis to confine the con-
cept of "voluntary assumption of risk" to those cases where a per-
son has full freedom of volition, and where by an unconstrained
consent on his part, he may destroy the element of non-consent re-
quisite to the tort.5 When, on the other hand, the plaintiff has acted
under an exigency caused by the defendant's wrongful misconduct,
as in the principal case, and the inquiry is whether the plaintiff had
a legal right or a legal or social duty to so act, the question involved
is best described as whether or not the defendant violated any duty
of care to the plaintiff.6 It is well to distinguish the problem in-
volved from the already vexatious problem of "proximate cause." 7
To quote Professor Bohlen: 8
"To say that an act is the proximate cause of an injury only
as between the parties is to add a new element of confusion to
a subject already difficult. If the act and the consequences are
the same, the legal proximity of the one to the other, depending
as it does on the foresight of the normal man or on the course
of nature, cannot be affected by the personality of the plain-
tiff, who it is true, may for other reasons, be barred by it."
The question whether contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is present is even more separate and distinct from the prob-
lem involved in the decision of the Missouri court. For even if a
person has a legal right or a legal or social duty to protect certain
interests, yet he cannot recover if under the particular circumstances,
it was rash to attempt to exercise the right, or he did not go about it
with ordinary care. 9 The concept of "contributory negligence" is
best confined to these latter elements.
It would seem, then, that the most appropriate way to describe
the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri would be to say that
under the circumstances the defendant's servant violated no duty of
care to the plaintiff. However the description used by the Missouri
court, that the plaintiff's act, and not the defendant's servant's act,
was the proximate cause of the injury, is the language used by most
'For a thorough consideration of this problem and an analysis on which




For a concise statement of the various theories of legal proximity, see Note
(1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 485.
'Op. cit. supra note 4, at 444, n. 6.
'Ibid. at 445-447 and 5Ol et seq.
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of the decisions. Regardless of how the result is described, the
question remains to be discussed whether the principal case is 
in
accord with the general judicial opinion, when it decides that an em-
ployee who leaves a position of safety to save his master's property
which has been endangered by the negligence of a fellow servant,
may not recover on the theory of the fellow servant's negligence, 
for
an injury that he sustains in so acting.
Before proceeding with this investigation, it will be well to
distinguish it from several analogous situations involving the so-
called "imminent peril" doctrine. The first of these is the situation
where a rescuer is injured in an attempt to save a human life from
danger, the courts in such cases universally allowing a recovery."'
The most forceful exposition of the reason for the rule is made by
Cardoza, J., in a recent New York case,
11 the learned judge saying:
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons
of relief. The law does not ignore these reactions in tracing
conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It
places their effects within the range of the natural and prob-
able . . . Continuity in such circumstances is not broken by
the exercise of volition . . . It is enough that the act, whether
impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion."
In these cases, in addition to holding that the intervening act is fore-
seeable, the courts generally hold that, as the desire to rescue is so
consuming, the rescuer will not be bound to observe a high degree of
regard for his own safety.'
2 Such a conclusion, of course, indicates
that the courts feel that the intervention of the rescuer is a most rea-
sonable one, and will do all in their power to aid a recovery. The
second type of situation which should be distinguished from that in
the principal case is where a person attempts to save his own prop-
erty from damage which has been threatened by the negligence of
the defendant, and receives personal injuries in so doing. In such
cases, a recovery is generally granted,
1 the reason being that
the plaintiff is under a positive legal duty to use reasonable efforts
to mitigate the amount of defendant's damages to himself, and, fur-
ther, to prevent other damage which the original wrongful act may
cause. 14 A third type of case to be distinguished is that in which an
" Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 5o8, 137 N. W. 12 (1912);
Donahue v. Wabash R. R., 83 Mo. 56o (1884) ; Eckert v. Long Island R. R.,
43 N. Y. 502 (1871) ; Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 Atl. 1O7O (19oo).
Cf. Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 98 N. W. 50o (29o4).
"Wagner v. International Railway Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437
(1921).
See Note (1922) i A. L. R. 4.
"Ill. Central R. R. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N. E. 362 (1907); Berg v.
Great Northern R. R., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648 (1897) ; Wilson v. Northern
Pacific R. R., 3o N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429 (1915).
" See Note (i9o8) 15 L. R. A. (N. s.) 8ig.
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employee intervenes to save property of his master, but does so under
direct commands from one of his superiors, and receives injuries in
the course of the undertaking. In such cases a recovery is always
granted, 5 because not only is the intervening act foreseeable, but in
fact it was authorized and directed by a representative of the negli-
gent defendant, and therefore the propriety of the plaintiff's recov-
ery is unquestioned. 16
Having distinguished the problem from cognate questions, an ex-
amination of the authorities discloses that very few courts have
passed on the precise point raised by the Johnson case. In the lead-
ing case of Puliman Palace Car Co. v. Laack,17 an employee volun-
tarily left his place of safety and attempted to save his master's
property from fire, and was injured in so doing. In allowing a re-
covery, the court, treating the problem as a question of causation,
said:
"It is contended, however, that defendant's' negligent act
was not the proximate cause of the injury. A new cause, it is
said, intervened between such negligence and the injury to ap-
pellee... We cannot assent to this contention. Where the acts
and events that intervene between the first cause and the injury
are the natural result of such first cause, and follow it in an
immediate and unbroken sequence, such first cause must be held
to be the proximate cause of the injury."
To the argument that, although the defendant was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence, he could have chosen a safer method of saving
the property, the court answered:
"Justice will not permit appellants to escape the conse-
quences of their own negligence, and defeat appellee's claim for
reparation, by urging against him his faithful endeavor to pro-
tect their property from a danger which their negligence cre-
ated."
Several other decisions are substantially to the same effect."s Of
course, if the damage threatened is trivial, and the risk involved in
'Erie R. R. v. Caldwell, 264 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920 ) ; Harker v.Railway Co., 88 Iowa 409, 55 N. W. 316 (1893); Dean v. Railroad, 156 Mo.
App. 634, 137 S. W. 6o3 (19,1).
"G Also distinguish between the case in which an employee intervenes to save
life and the case in which he intervenes to save Properiy. On this point, see St.
Louis R. R. v. Morgan, 115 Ark. 602, 174 S. W. 546 (1915); Note (19o6) 2
L. R. A. (,. s.) 954; Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 4, at 444, n. 6.
"41 I1l. App. 34 (891).
The next case with facts substantially in point which allowed a recovery
was the case of Pepgram v. Seaboard Airline Railway, 139 N. C. 303, 5, S. E.975 (9o5). In that case the court approved of the following instruction:
"The only limitation of the rule that an employee or servant or other person
may incur risk to save property is that one must not recklessly expose himself to
NOTES
attempting to save it is substantial, an employee is not justified in in-
tervening. 19 These cases are in obvious conflict with the rule of the
Missouri court in the principal case, to the effect that intervention
could never be foreseen.
It is necessary at this point to examine a few cases which do not
allow a recovery, to determine whether such cases are in accord with
the decision in the principal case. The case of Chattanooga Light &
Power Co. v. Hodges 20 is often cited as an authority for the proposi-
tion that an employee who voluntarily attempts to save his master's
property, and is injured in making the attempt, cannot recover, because
his attempted rescue is the proximate cause of his own injury. How-
ever, it is believed that the court in that case never intended to lay
down the broad -principle that has been attributed to it. The facts
show that the plaintiff rushed into a burning building to save prop-
erty, and the court said:
"Where the injury results from an act committed by the
injured party so obviously fraught with peril as should be suf-
ficient to deter one of reasonable intelligence . . . it would
seem impossible to find any ground upon which to maintain
that the person guilty of the first negligence should be held
liable to the party injured . . . In such a case the intervening
act of the party injured should be treated as the proximate cause
of his injury."
This language is perfectly in accord with the principles outlined in
the cases which do allow ta recovery. Under the facts in the Chat-
danger. When he does not recklessly expose himself to danger, because of the
duty he owes his employer to attempt to save his property, his act is relieved of
the character of legal cause, and the liability is remitted to the negligence of the
defendant."
In Trinity R. R. v. Elgin, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 573, 121 S. W. 577 (1909),
where an employee seeing a freight car about to be smashed intervened and
attempted to save the property and was injured in so doing, the court, finding
that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, allowed a recovery.
This case is particularly interesting as it is clearly evident in the opinion of the
court that, because of the emergency and necessity for quick action, the plaintiff
would not be required to act as carefully as he would be in an ordinary situation.
See also dictum to same effect in Stevens v. Henningsen Co., 53 Mont. 3o6, 163
Pac. 470 (1917).
In the cases of Hollenback v. Stone Emergency Corp., 46 Mont. 559, 129
Pac. io58 (913) and Martin v. North Jersey Street Railway Co., 8i N. J. L.
562, 8o At. 477 (i9iI), the plaintiffs were allowed to recover, when, as em-
ployees, they were injured in voluntarily attempting to save property of their
masters from destruction. In both cases the courts expressly stated that it was
a duty of every faithful employee to reasonably attempt to conserve the property
of his master.
" Judkins v. Maine Central R. R., 8o Me. 417, 14 At. 735 (i888) ; McCon-
nell v. Block Co., 26 Ga. App. 550, io6 S. E. 617 (1921). This is merely an
application of the principle that if the risk is not proportionate to the damage
threatened, the intervener is guilty of contributory negligence.
io9 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W. 616 (i9o2).
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tanooga case, the risk was so great that the plaintiff's assumption to
act branded him with contributory negligence. The recent Michi-
gan case of Bacon v. Payne 21 is to same effect.
The above cases fairly represent those in which a recovery has
been denied, and it is believed that, even though the intervener is not
justified in taking as great a risk when property as contradistinguished
from human life is endangered, if a case arises in which the inter-
vening act of the employee is shown to be reasonable and careful,
the courts in those jurisdictions will not follow the Missouri
rule, but will allow a recovery. Only one case 22 has been found in
which the decision is strictly in accord with the principal case, and
no valid reasons for the holding were there presented.
Whether a person in some other relationship to the owner of
property than that of employee can recover from a tortfeasor, when
injured in an attempt to save property endangered by said wrong-
doer, would seem to be subject to the same fundamental tests. The
inquiry in such case should be whether, considering the particular
relationship in queston, the plaintiff was under such a legal or social
duty to intervene, that his intervention may not be considered his
voluntary act. If that inquiry is answered in the affirmative, then
it would seem that the intervenor should be able to recover. In
accordance with this principle it was held in Liming v. R. R. 23 that one
who was injured in reasonably attempting to defend a neighbor's
property from fire, caused by the negligence of the defendant, could
recover.
In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that most jurisdictions
are apparently in harmony concerning the right of an employee to
intervene to save his master's property, the differences in result being
caused solely by variances in the facts. It would seem, not only upon
strict legal principles, but upon the broader ground of public policy,
that any decided shift in favor of the Missouri rule would be most
regrettable, not only because it appears to be rankly unjust to the
employee, but because it also places a premium on his unfaithful
service.
A. M. H., Jr.
220 Mich. 672, 19o N. W. 716 (1922). In that case the plaintiff was in-
jured while attempting to turn a switch in order to avert a disaster to property.
The court clearly indicates that a recovery was not allowed, only because the
plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances, for it says: "The
rule for exoneration from negligence where the injured party acted in an emer-
gency does not apply where his conduct is rash and reckless."
=26 Ga. App. 739, 107 S. E. 276 (1921).
'Liming v. 11. Central R. R., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (i8go) ; (1917)
27 YALE L. JOUR. 415. Contra: Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N. W. 388
(1885). As to whether the neighbor could recover where the property threat-
ened by the defendant's carelessness was defendant's property, cf. Saylor v. Par-
sons, supra note 10.
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INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN LAWBOoKS-Anderson Co. v.
Baldwin Law Publishing Co.,, recently decided, held that where the
plaintiff had published an eleven volume annotated edition of the
Ohio code and where the defendant had made lists of the citations of
cases found in the plaintiff's books to supplement the defendant's own
inadequate search of the original reports for all cases construing Ohio
statutes, thereafter reading the reports cited and writing up his own
original notes in his two volume edition of the Ohio code, the plaintiff
was entitled to an injunction to restrain what was an unfair use of
his volumes.
2
In order to properly discuss the suggested problem as to what
constitutes unfair use of copyrighted material, it is necessary to first
inquire into the legal bases of copyright. Under the Constitution
of the United States 3 Congress has the power:
"To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
rights to their respective writings and discoveries."
Copyright property is purely statutory and depends upon the right
created under the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the author-
ity conferred by the Constitution.4 Each copyright statute cre-
ates a new right and does not extend or continue a previously exist-
ing right.5 The Act of March 4, 19o9 6 is the last of a series of acts,
inaugurated by the original Act of May 31, 1790,7 attempting to
cover the field of copyright." Section I (a) of the Act of 19o9 sets
forth as the privileges conferred upon authors by the statute, the
right "to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted
work." Section 5 of the Act includes as matter subject to copy-
right, "books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories,
gazateers and other compilations."
The accepted short definition of the nature of copyright is the
exclusive right to multiply or reproduce copies.9 It is clear that a
127 Fed. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
'The court considered a mass of conflicting evidence upon the question
whether there had been further use in the form of direct copying of plaintiff's
annotations which if proven would clearly have constituted unfair use, but the
primary ground for the decision stated in the text is expressly independent of
this matter. However, the presence of this element in an equity case partially
weakens it as a holding for the proposition stated.
3 Art. I, Sec. 8 (8).
'American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 28 Sup. Ct 72
(1907) ; American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
5Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 591 (1834).
'35 STAT. 1075 (I909), U. S. C. (1926) TiT. XVII, § I.
7 I STAT. 124 (790).
'The English Copyright Act now in force, I & 2 GEo. V, c. 46 (I911), is
largely similar in scope and content to our Act of i9og.
'Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 920 (1854) ; Walter v. Lane [ioo]
A. C. 539, 550.
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copyright in any sort of law book is infringed when there is an actual
copying of the words as they appear in the copyrighted work; the
act expressly reserves to the author the exclusive right to copy his
production. Classical language descriptive of copyright is that,
"the subject of property is the order of words . . . ; not the
words themselves, they being analogous to the elements of mat-
ter which are not appropriated unless combined, nor the ideas
expressed by those words, they existing in the mind alone, which
is not capable of appropriation." 10
But if we accept the theory that copyright exists in the order of the
words, and that infringement consists in an exact reproduction of
those words, we are met with the difficulty of being unable to ex-
plain cases where it has been held an infringement, first, to copy the
thought set forth in a copyrighted work disguising and paraphrasing
the first author's language so as to present a superficially different
expression, and second, to appropriate the prior author's ideas of
arrangement or selection. In neither of these cases is there any
actual copying or reproduction of words. It would therefore be
more accurate to conclude that copyright exists in the succession of
ideas expressed and in the arrangement of the ideas, as well as in
the particular mode of expression.
Furthermore, copyright is not in the nature of an absolute
monopoly. Unlike a patent or trade-mark which confers monopoly
for all purposes, copyright enables an author to monopolize the ideas
expressed in his book only partially. His monopoly on his ideas is
limited to a right to have enjoined a misuse of the work employed
by him in expressing the ideas. Thus, while a patent is held to be
infringed when its principle is duplicated, independently or not, two
authors may each consistently evolve and copyright substantially
identical productions, provided their work was independent, and the
copyright of neither of them will be infringed Furthermore the pub-
lisher of a copyrighted book often intends that his work be copied for
certain purposes by members of the public; his book would be of no
value to him and would not effectuate the purpose of his composition
if it were not so used. It is of the utmost importance that this circum-
stance be kept in mind when we seek to ascertain the exact limits of
the monopoly conferred by copyright."1
When we proceed to consider the rule according to which the
use of a copyrighted book is judged to be fair or otherwise, it ap-
pears that there is no one inclusive test to determine what in law
is an infringement. Partly because of the impracticability of the thing
and partly because a definite and particular statement of the limits
" Erle, J., in Jeffreys v. Boosey, supra note 9, at 867. See Holmes v. Hurst,
174 U. S. 83, 86, i Sup. Ct. 6o6, 607 (1899).
' Cf. WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAW (1917), 375 et seq.; COPINGER, LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT (6th ed. 1927) 2.
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of permissible use would invite schemes and devices to use unfairly
within the spirit of such rule, courts have regularly refused to go
much further than to decide each case according to its facts and in
the light of general fairness in its natural sense. Section 25 of the
Copyright Act of r909 simply enacts:
"That if any person shall infringe the copyright of any
work protected under the copyright laws of the United States
such person shall be liable :"
in certain civil proceedings. The original draft of the Act defined
infringement as
"doing or causing to be done, without the consent of the copy-
right proprietor first obtained in writing, any act the exclu-
sive right to do or authorize which is by 'copyright' laws re-
served to such proprietor," 12
This comprehensive, but not especially helpful definition, was stricken
out before the bill was enacted. However, the English Act 13 contains
such a provision with a number of exceptions.
Realizing, then, that Congress has seen fit to lay down no gen-
eral rule by which to determine "unfair use," it will be well to con-
sider the factors which are involved in making such a determina-
tion. The first of these factors is the character of the copyrighted
book. The cases have drawn a- distinction between publications
which are primarily the product of literary, creative or imaginative
ability and works which are compilations or collections of facts and
statements found elsewhere. 4 For example, in text-books, treatises
and encyclopedias the literary element predominates; in digests, law
reports, annotated statutes and form books the clerical element is
primary. But the two groups are not mutually exclusive. A certain
class of books cannot necessarily be put entirely in one group or the
other in every case. Thus, a form-book, which is usually a compila-
tion of forms used in practice, may have to be classified as a literary
creation in a case where the author cbnceives his own forms. Nor
can any one particular publication be conclusively labeled either as a
literary work or as a compilation. Thus, a text-book is in the nature
of a compilation in so far as it has been composed through the routine
of finding and citing authorities; a digest, which is primarily a com-
pilation, must be treated as a literary creation in so far as its text
and scheme of arrangement are original. The theory behind this dis-
tinction is that while each type of work is protected in some degree,
yet work in the nature of a compilation must submit to a broader use,
Sec. 23, Copyright Bill, Copyright Office Bulletin No. 12, p. 41.
" Supra note 8.
' See for example Colliery Engineering Co. v. Ewald, i26 Fed. 843 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1903).
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since it is impliedly dedicated to use as a tool to lead other persons to
the original sources, in a manner which more nearly approximates
copying than is true in the case of literary creations. 15
A second factor to be considered is the character of the person
who uses the copyrighted publication and his purpose in so doing.
It is clear that a lawyer might fairly copy the material in a digest
in the preparation of a brief, for the reason that the digest was dedi-
cated to such use. On the other hand, it is clear that one compiler
cannot fairly copy material as it appears in a prior compilation of
the same kind. But assuming that a person uses a prior book merely
as a guide, verifies the facts stated and then expresses them in his
own fashion, is such use, otherwise deemed fair, to be considered
unfair because of the circumstance that the two books in controversy
are similar in scope and nature and their authors are competitors?
The English cases, after a period of uncertainty, have reached
the conclusion that the prior editor of a literary work or a compilation
is protected against servile copying of the material found in his book,
but may not complain against the use to which his volume was dedi-
cated, namely, use as a means of leading others to the original sources,
even though the means is adopted by the editor of a rival publica-
tion.'
There is a great deal of language in the American cases which
would seem to lend color to the view that competitive disadvantage
suffered by a copyright proprietor is a positive factor to be consid-
ered.17  But practically without exception such expressions were
made by way of dictum, the cases being explainable on the ground
that there was a direct or indirect copying of material. For example,
in West Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-Op. Co."8 it was held an
infringement for defendant to copy into his law reports syllabi found
in plaintiff's reports, paraphrasing the language; this was clearly
' This is true for the added reason that it is a bit arbitrary to say that com-
pilations of fact "promote the progress of science and useful arts" and that
therefore it was a stretch of the Constitution to have allowed such works to be
copyrighted in the first place. See Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Publish-
ing Co., 146 Fed. 332, 333 (C. C. Conn. 19o6).
16 Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 251 (1870) ; Morris v. Wright, L. R.
5 Ch. App. 279 (187o) ; see Lewis v. Fullerton, 2 Beav. 6 (Eng. 1839) ; Jarrold v.
Houlston, 3 Kay & J. 708 (Eng. 1857). But see Kelly v. Morris, L. R. i Eq.
697 (1866).
'Banks v. McDivitt, Fed. Cas. No. 961 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875) (anno-
tated rules of court) ; List Pub. Co. v. Keller, 30 Fed. 772 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1887) (social registers) ; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617 (1888) (law
reports) ; George Bisel v. Welsh, i3I Fed. 564, (C. C. Pa. 1004) (difest of
Pennsylvania laws). The case of Mead v. West Publishing Co., 8o Fed. 380
(C. C. Minn. 1896), appears to be curiously out of line even with the holding
of the foregoing cases; here defendant copied a number of plaintiff's citations,
the books being rival editions on Stephen on Pleading, without reference to the
o-iginal reports, but the court refused to enjoin defendant's publication, though
there was a clear case of copying.
1864 Fed. 36o (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1894), reversed on other grounds, 79 Fed.
756 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897).
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copying, but the court strongly emphasized the so-called unfair ap-
propriation of plaintiff's labor and finds the offense to lie in such
practice rather than in the simple reproduction of plaintiff's thought
and language39 Although in these cases the wrongful act was a direct
copying, the courts go out of their way to emphasize the fact that the
effect of such practice was to enable the subsequent compiler to un-
fairly compete with his predecessor by obtaining a similar result with
considerably less effort.
Several American cases do recognize the validity of the conten-
tion that copyright in a compilation can be infringed only by an actual
copying, which is not present when the prior work is used merely as
a lead to original sources. 20 Thus, in Dun v. International Mercantile
Agency,21 defendant's use of plaintiff's credit book for the purpose of
discovering the names of firms and associations engaged in business,
to be inserted in defendant's publication which it was preparing, was
not such unfar use as to entitle plaintiff to an injunction.
It would seem that a competitor should not be forbidden all use
of a prior work, even though it is no more than a collection of facts.
He should not be denied the privilege of using the prior work as a
tool to lead him to the original sources simply on the ground that he
is a competitor. The prior work was impliedly dedicated to this very
use without respect to any distinctions as to the persons who may
happen to have occasion to so employ it. An often repeated dictunt
in Moffatt v. Gill 22 goes to the root of the matter:
"You cannot, where another man has compiled a directory,
simply take his sheets and reprint them as your own, but you
are entitled, taking the sheets with you, to go and see whether
the existing facts concur with the description in the sheets, and
if you do that you may publish the result as your own."
Again, in Jewelers' Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 Fed.
83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), the court held it an infringement of plaintiff's trade-
mark directory for defendant to copy portions and to adopt the classification of
it; the court said that no one can legally take the results of the labor and expense
which another has incurred in publishing his work, and thereby save himself the
trouble of working out and arriving at those results by some independent road.
Such language would seem to be too inclusive and the court itself admits specifi-
cally that the first directory might have been used as a guide to the original
sources. Followed in American Hotel Directory Co. v. Pub. Co., 4 Fed. (2d)
415 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1925), another case of copying. The dissent in the
Jewelers' case is based partially on the ground that the instances of copying
seemed too few to be the basis of an injunction. This thought illustrates the
rule that whatever be its nature an infringement must be substantial before a
court of equity will enjoin it, the law taking no cognizance of trifles.
'Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., r22 Fed. 922 (C. L
A. 2d, 1903) (legal encyclopedias); West Pub. Co. v. Ed. Thompson Co., 6g
Fed. 833 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. i9o9), modified on other grounds in i76 Fed. 833
(C. C. A. 2d, 1910) ; White v. Bender, 185 Fed. 921 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. i9ii).
127 Fed. 173 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903).
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And the proper investigation in cases of this kind is whether the
defendant really verified the facts so that he could state them as
a result of an independent judgment of his own. If under all the
facts, the court concludes that the defendant did not exercise an
independent judgment in the matter, but relied on the prior book,
then he must be charged with substantially copying the plaintiff's
work. Where the defendant admits that he used a prior work as a
tool, the burden of proof should be put on him to show that he veri-
fied the facts to such an extent that he could state them on his own
authority.
There are two conflicting public policies involved in the ques-
tion of copyright infringement. First, in common fairness a subse-
quent author should not be allowed to reap the benefits of a prior
author's work, whatever may be its nature, without assuming some
of the burden. Second, it will retard rather than promote progress
in science and useful arts if we impose unreasonable limitations upon
the use of copyrighted material. If the law of copyright is applied
so as to deny a subsequent compiler the right to make ordinary use
of a prior compilation, that law becomes an instrument of retrogres-
sion because it hampers the use of previously accumulated knowledge.
The public policy favoring the facilitation of the propagation of
learning should outweigh the private disadvantage incurred by any
publisher by reason of such practice as was condemned in the Ander-
son case.
D.M.
